The computational level of memory cannot be described independently of its algorithmic level. Some definitions of computational functions are not independent of cognitive hypotheses of the algorithm-level theories. Moreover, the computational theory strongly constrains the nature of cognitive mechanisms Therefore the difficult theoretical
problem is to assign the various variables and processes to the appropriate level and to integrate the different levels.
Humphreys, Wiles & Dennis argue that the computational level of memory can be described independently of algorithmlevel theories. This issue is debatable. It is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to give a complete description of the general structure of the inputs, outputs and goals of the task without formulating some explicit or implicit hypotheses on the underlying cognitive mechanisms.
This kind of question is crucial for the definition of the computational primitives. As for instance, the "Intersection" function, proposed by Humphreys & al. , is mathematically and functionally unambiguous at the computational level and this function can be executed in different ways at the algorithm level (search, direct access, fine tuning). But it is not the case for the "choose" function because this function is relatively undefined at the computational level ; indeed the criteria of this decision are not set and what is a decision function without decision criteria ? Therefore at the computational level "choose" is not a general function but is a pseudo-function or an "empty" function, the complete and general mathematical definition of which is shifted to the algorithmic level. As a matter of fact, Humphreys & al. are very cautious on this topic: "There is, of course, a need for decision functions, but the ones we have proposed (...) are somewhat arbitrary". (section 3.1, § 4). In fact the criteria of a decision function cannot be separated from the function itself ; they merely are the goal of the decision. This problem of the nature of the decision process in memory is important. A specific model of human memory remains ambiguous if the decision mechanism is left unspecified: the "ambiguous-recall problem" (Hintzman, 1987 (Hintzman, , 1990 ) and the problem of recognition decision in CHARM (Metcalfe-Eich, 1985 , 1991 are good examples of this state of affairs.
The question of the autonomy of the computational level is also raised for the functional specifications. Humphreys & al. then suggest two alternatives for the List Specific Item Recognition (LSIR) (section 2.9). Are they the consequence of a simple modification of a same mathematical formal expression at the computational level ? Or, on the contrary, are they the consequence of an application of implicit cognitive hypotheses which are formulated at the algorithmic level ? Many cognitive retrieval processes could be proposed and discussed at the algorithmic level in various memory tasks: "relational context" (Humphreys 1976 ; Bain & Humphreys, 1988) ; "intrinsic and extrinsic contexts" (Jones, 1978) ; "forward and backward retrieval" (Mandler, 1980 (Mandler, , 1991 ; "relation between encoding and retrieval contexts" (Tiberghien, Cauzinille et Mathieu, 1979 ; Tiberghien, 1982 Tiberghien, , 1993 . One of them is based, for instance, on backward retrieval of context from target or forward retrieval of target from context. But this is precisely the computational description of the two alternatives of LSIR suggested by the authors: "the difference between these two specifications is that in the first the context is used to retrieve the words in the study list and in the second the test cue is used to retrieve the contexts in which it has occurred" (section 2.9, § 3). Such a computational analysis is not fundamentally different from the dual-process theories of recognition. According to these cognitive theories, recognition can result either from a direct access from the retrieval cue to the familiarity of the target or from a search process of the appropriate context. In other words, according to the alternatives of LSIR, the computational function "retrieve" may be applied, or not,to the contexts. This analysis corresponds to the cognitive interpretation, at the algorithmic level, in terms of context effects on the perceptual processes or on the memory stage. Elsewhere, Humphreys & al. restrict to the computational level a specific class of association (binding) between list context and target-words . But other associations are possible. For instance, the association between the list contexts and between the list contexts and the test context --as a function of their global and local similarities --is probably a critical factor of retrieval (Schreiber,Rousset & Tiberghien, 1991 ; Tiberghien 1981 Tiberghien , 1984 Tiberghien , 1986 Tiberghien , 1989 . Therefore what are the logical or theoretical criteria for the assignment of a defined variable or process to the computational or algorithmic levels ? Can we give a strict computational description, entirely free of implicit reference to the cognitive level and can we specify every algorithm-level problem at the computational level (for example: false recognition, subjective confidence, feeling-of knowing, tip-of-the-tongue)?
Finally, the computational theory strongly constrains the nature of cognitive mechanisms. For instance the settheoretical formal model is probably more compatible with some cognitive processes (localization of independant or superposed traces, retrieval by set intersection) than with neuronal attractor networks (totally distributed traces, retrieval by resonance between traces and cues). At the computational level there is a strong contradiction between a description in terms of "goals of the task" and a description based on "attractors" or "resonance". On the other hand, is the hybrid characteristics of recognition (retrieval based on familiarity or search, for instance) a specific cognitive feature or, on thecontrary, a general computational property ? A computational theory is inseparable of a formal system which constrains the algorithm-level models. The computational theory is also associated to "meta-computational" postulates which are not necessary strong logical consequences of the formal system but which determine the cognitive-model level (continuous / all-or-none, localized / distributed, serial / parallel / cascade , etc.). Though the problem is out of the scope of Humphreys & al.'s paper, it is clear that the question of articulation between computational-level theory, cognitive processes and the neurological implementation-level can be delayed but not avoided: for instance, how can an hybrid system, both symbolic and connectionist, simulate semantic and episodic aspects of memory (Anderson 1990 ) ? How can a distributed neural network reproduce a semantic organization (Rodet & Tiberghien, in press ) ? In short, the problem with Marr's taxonomy is not restrained to the possibility of build the theories at the computational, algorithmic and neurological levels. The most difficult problem is to select the appropriate level of description for the different variables and processes, and to integrate these different levels (Shanon 1992) .
